The soaring cost of medical malpractice insurance has stimulated debate in many quarters. Following a dialogue between the deans of the Yale schools of medicine and law, a group of physicians and lawyers at the Yale School of Medicine examined the decision-making processes involved in bringing a hypothetical malpractice case for both adjudication and compensation in the courts.
Recently, Dr. Leon Rosenberg of the School of Medicine and Professor Guido Calabresi of the Law School engaged in a Deans' Dialogue to shed some light, rather than heat, on this subject. Dr. Rosenberg raised the question of whether the legal means being used to control medicine and the conduct of some lawyers implementing the laws are moving our society in a direction such that the largest number of people have available the highest quality of health care. Dean Calabresi pointed out that the tort system was being used to solve a problem it had not been designed to solve: namely, the provision of compensation to victims of medical maloccurrence which results in financial hardship. This interdisciplinary discussion was organized to follow up the deans' initiative and to examine this subject further.
CASE PRESENTATION DR. PAUL BARASH: A six-year-old female child was admitted for an elective tonsillectomy and adenoidectomy (T & A). The history showed that, except for recurrent bouts of tonsillitis and ear infections, she was normal and healthy. An early morning tonsillectomy and adenoidectomy was accompanied by moderate blood loss but was otherwise uncomplicated. The patient emerged from anesthesia with stable vital signs and was transferred to the recovery area in stable condition. Recovery was uneventful, and she was returned to her room.
There were no difficulties until 8:00 P.M. that evening, when a nurse noted that the child had bright red blood coming from her mouth. The child was pale, with a blood pressure of 70 over 50, and a heart rate of 130 beats per minute. Approximately one minute later, the nurse called the surgeon's answering service and approximately ten minutes after that, the surgeon returned the call and asked the nurse to call anesthesia. The surgeon stated that he was immediately coming to the hospital from home. The nurse paged the anesthesiologist, who arrived two minutes later. He evaluated the child and felt that she was in imminent danger of having a cardiac arrest. He decided to attempt an awake intubation to secure the airway. The child was uncooperative, and this procedure was unsuccessful. Approximately five minutes later (8:20 P.M.), the surgeon arrived. After a short discussion with the anesthesiologist, the surgeon called the operating room to book the case as an acute emergency. Unfortunately, the entire operating room staff, including the emergency staff, were tied up with cases from which no personnel could be spared. The arrival of additional operating room (OR) nursing would have taken approximately 30-45 minutes.
The anesthesiologist and the surgeon decided that the urgency of the problem warranted use of the treatment room adjacent to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). At approximately 8:25 P.M., the child was transported to the treatment area with the following vital signs: the blood pressure was 60/40, the pulse was 150, and the child was noted to be very pale. At 8:27 P.M., the anesthesiologist rapidly secured the airway with what is called a "rapid sequence induction." The child was given ketamine and succinylcholine, a muscle relaxant. An endotracheal tube was placed, and adequate ventilation was assured by auscultation in five points. One minute later, at 8:28, the patient became asystolic by electrocardiogram, and cardiopulmonary resucitation (CPR) was begun with a code call. As resuscitative efforts continued, the surgeon applied a suture to a bleeding blood vessel. Approximately ten minutes later, the vital signs returned to normal (blood pressure 110/70, pulse of 120, respiratory rate of 16 with controlled respiration). The patient remained unresponsive. She was transferred to the ICU where there was no change in the vital signs. At 9:30 P.M. the surgeon and anesthesiologist spoke with the parents about the events that had occurred. At Also, were the dosages of ketamine and succinylcholine appropriate? Succinylcholine can produce bradycardia. Why wasn't atropine given to counteract the bradycardia? Why was there an attempt to pass the endotracheal tube with the patient awake? Did additional trauma increase the bleeding? Was the management of the code appropriate? Was the suture material used by the surgeon on the artery that bled appropriate, and was it placed appropriately? These medical questions would have to be answered by experts. Nonetheless, if the chart doesn't contain needed information, experts can't speculate about what was done or not done. In a case like this, then, there may be no way for the attorney representing the family to get a clear picture of what happened until after suit is initiated. And suit cannot be initiated unless the plaintiff has an expert willing to state that a departure from the normal standard of care has occurred.
A number of other issues are involved. These cases are taken on a contingency fee basis, which means that, in the event that there is no recovery, the family owes the attorney nothing for his work. The reason for this is that families who face extremely large medical and hospital expenses could not afford to hire counsel if they had to pay an attorney on an hourly basis to prepare these cases. If the case is not brought because it is not felt, after appropriate investigation, that the case can be won, the family's only expense would be the out-of-pocket costs that the attorney incurs for obtaining the record. It should be noted that the cost of a record following a long hospitalization and for physician review of the record can be substantial. This devastating case is a big deal in the medical malpractice sense in terms of how to defend the case, because there's no negligence. I'm sure there will be many people who feel that this is a known risk of the procedure. Even though this kind of outcome is unexpected in a tonsillectomy, it can happen. We'd want to defend this case aggressively, but what would you do if you were representing a hospital and a group of physicians concerned about their professional practice if the family said, "Fine, we'll settle for $50,000." This child is still on a ventilator. It's costing a hundred thousand, probably more, a year to take care of the child. The family recognizes there's probably no malpractice, but they want $50,000, $100,000 to settle the case. Think about that, because many physicians say, "We will defend it to the hilt. We didn't do anything wrong." Assume we did nothing wrong in this case. What would a jury do with this case? Would a jury of six lay people in Connecticut think that we were wrong in any way? And would they think that a child who went in for a simple tonsillectomy and came out severely brain-damaged is worthy of any sympathy? Anyone involved must think through these unpleasant issues. As in-house counsel at the hospital and medical school, we try to balance the reactions of the health care people who feel they have done everything right or, in some cases, have not and want a resolution for the sake of the family, for their own sakes in terms of publicity, or in terms of escalating insurance premiums. This tragedy would play out in court for a very long time.
My final comment is about experts. We all know there are experts for hire. The fact that there would be an expert available to say that something went wrong in this case wouldn't impress me a bit. The considerations are the credentials of the expert and the fact that the relatively few cases that go to trial are those in which liability is very much in question, the two parties cannot agree, and it's an issue of experts.
MR. WILLIAM RUSH: I'm the fellow that generally gets the case from the insurance company. First of all, we have to recognize that physicians aren't alone in being sued for professional liability. Architects, engineers, accountants, and lawyers also get sued. Sometimes questions are raised as to what role the insurance company plays, I play, and the particular defendant plays. All these cases involve a similar issue: the exercise of professional judgment. We talk about deviations from standards in the exercise of judgment. They all involve technical areas, as David has mentioned. He and I probably begin reviewing a case by assuming that we know nothing because that's one way to find out information. A major concern is the designation of issues around which the case is going to be resolved. To do that, I do not need to be a doctor. It does mean that sooner or later I must know as much about certain of the procedures as the people, primarily the experts, on the other side know.
The first problem is to identify what those issues are. In this case, there is a crucial period starting at 8:00 P.M. and ending 29 minutes later, when procedures are started. I want to review each and every decision made during that period, why it was made, what indications there were for it being made, and what contraindications there were. Generally, if I come into a case after I have the complaint, I do not wish to rely upon what David alleged in his complaint. I like to know about the problematic facts as soon as possible because, in most instances, they can be addressed. The good points in your favor always have a way of coming out, usually when you want them to come out. The bad aspects of a case have a way of coming out when you don't want them to come out.
I also have to be cognizant of those with whom are we dealing: a hospital, a physician, or two different sets of physicians. David may sue the surgeon and/or the anesthesiologist and/or the hospital and its employees. One of my initial problems is to identify any true conflicts between the various defendants. Presumptively, each will be represented by a different attorney, so there's no technical conflict. I have to decide, however, in which areas I can cooperate with the other lawyers, based on whether our interests are identical or conflicting. In defending the action, we would be involved in the pleadings and the discovery, selection of the experts, and the actual trial. A major problem exists when insurance coverage is inadequate to take care of an expected or possible verdict in the case. If one of the defendants in this case had $100,000 worth of insurance, it obviously would not be enough. In that situation, I would never give the insurance company an opinion not to settle. It would be their decision. I would not put my client, the physician, in a position that could be damaging to him or her in the final analysis of the case. In summary, we try to represent the defendant from the posture of an attorney being paid by someone other than the insurance company. I cannot recall any serious questions that have ever arisen in the 25-30 years that I've been practicing, but the potential for problems does exist, particularly with regard to settlement of a case. The doctor may have strong feelings about whether the case should be settled. It can be difficult when you work closely with somebody, and neither you nor he has the right to settle the case. The insurance company makes that decision. Quite often we deal with people from the insurance company, whom we know quite well, and they will accept our advice. As far as any true conflicts go, however, our allegiance is to the person who was sued, who has paid for and received insurance coverage, and not to the insurance company. consent" clearly states that it is incumbent upon the treating physicians to disclose those risks which the law says are material and relevant to the patient's informed choice to consent or not to consent to a particular treatment. There's no question in this case that post-operative bleeds are known risks following tonsillectomies. They don't happen very often, but they happen. If the physicians or the hospital argues that this was a known risk for which no one was responsible, my response is, "If you knew it was a risk, how can you have a set-up which allowed 20-25 minutes to go by before the child was able to receive any meaningful treatment to control the bleeding?" That is what I think makes this case a winner. If you know that something like this can happen, then at least be equipped to meet the problem and treat it in a timely, effective fashion. MS. RODDY: I agree with David's comments about what would happen in court, although few directed verdicts actually occur. It's certainly true with very few exceptions that a case will not get to a jury without an expert. I reiterate, though, that it is not impossible for either side, defense or plaintiff, in most cases to find someone, particularly in a case like this where there are issues, questions, and problems. Generally, the medicine looks pretty good, but there are some gaps, as David has pointed out. Why didn't you have the appropriate resources? Why didn't you move more quickly?-and so on. There is no question that the plaintiff could get an expert, and we would probably lose the case. Many medical malpractice attorneys think that juries are pretty good on the issue of negligence. I think they come in extremely anxious to do their civic duty, listen closely, do what the judge says, and follow the rules of court. If the expert David brings in, for example, is not a very good expert or doesn't make sense to them, then we might very well win the case.
There is, however, a problem with how juries handle the issue of damages. A damage award may include compensation for medical expenses, lost earnings, impaired future earning capacity, pain and suffering, mental anguish, and loss of consortium. If we lose this case, and this possibility is what we're trying to balance in deciding whether to settle it, how much do you think the jury is going to award? $100,000? $500,000? How much is this case worth? Well, it's worth a lot of money if it is lost, something the insurance company and others have to think very carefully about. A defendant can go to court and say, "I really want to win this case and vindicate myself," and that's important. But when you lose for three million dollars, guess on which page of the newspaper the story will be.
I have never seen a case yet which is possible to defend by saying, "We didn't have the resources because it's just too expensive." I'm not saying this is right or wrong. Nobody wants to hear about what you didn't have available for his or her child. MR. RUSH: I would rather try this case before a jury than a judge. One of the problems in this case is that someone noticed at 8:00 P.M. that there was something wrong with the child. There was a 15-minute delay before a physician, the anesthesiologist, looked at the child. What explanations are there for that 15 minutes? If you have trouble explaining or can't convince a jury that what you did was reasonable, then it may be that it was not reasonable. DR. KATZ: I think it was Justice Holmes who said that hard cases make bad law, and most malpractice cases, like this one, make bad law because they are so controversial. This case might be decided on the basis of malpractice or, as it probably would be, on the basis that the child will need financial support for the rest of her life. That has nothing to do with many of the issues of malpractice. I believe that some of our medical experts should be hauled before ethics committees of the Connecticut Medical Society and told, "How could you testify in this case the way you did? It's unconscionable and unprofessional, and if you continue you may want to consider whether your behavior comports with acceptable professional practices."
We also haven't done our homework with respect to the problem of medical uncertainty. There's so much in medicine that is still uncertain, and yet we haven't figured out how to communicate this uncertainty to patients in a therapeutic fashion. To the extent that risks are important in order for the patient to arrive at a decision, those risks have to be communicated to the patient weeks before she has become, in a sense, a prisoner of the hospital. If risks are discussed the night before the operation, maybe after medication already has been given or after the family has made all the arrangements, it is not realistic to expect the patient or parents to say, "Thank you very much. I'm going to sign out immediately." MR. SCHUCK: It seems to me there are at least three levels on which to analyze this problem. One is with respect to this particular case-what happened, what went wrong, and why. The second has to do with relationships: the structural, institutional, and professional relationships that produce these cases. And the third level is with respect to resolving the malpractice problem in a better way than it is being resolved now. Are there other ways in which these types of disputes might be resolved that are less costly to society, less traumatic to patients, less damaging to physicians, and, finally, less damaging to the communication between professionals and families? Perhaps with your questions we can try to elicit a set of observations, proposals, or insights that will address these different levels. In addition, it seems to me, there are a couple of perspectives that would be valuable in understanding disputes like this. One has to do with possible conflict between the anesthesiologist and the surgeon. Dr. Lytton has agreed to give us his view of the case and how it might differ from that of the anesthesiologist. Second, if we have a journalist in the audience, I would like to know how he or she would cover this type of dispute, and what consideration, if any, would be given to the reputation of the physicians or the sensibilities of the injured girl. Would there be any follow-up when the case is dismissed, settled, or resolved against the plaintiff? DR. LYTTON: Jay raised a question regarding whether the surgery should have been done in the first place. I think we have to assume, for the sake of argument, that this situation was discussed with the parents and that risks and benefits were reasonably analyzed. I don't know that every surgeon, when he talks to parents, states that death is a possible outcome, especially in a minor procedure like this, which has a very small chance of serious complication. I think you have to intimate that there's no procedure that doesn't have a potential for complication. In this case, the surgeon should stand as one with the anesthesiologist. I think that the two are inextricably bound up and the fact that the ligature came off is just as much an untoward complication as is the child having an arrest from a difficult intubation. DR. BARASH: The anesthesiologist is put in one of the most terrible situations that is intrinsic to the practice of anesthesia: an airway problem which puts the patient at great risk. It may be that the cardiac arrest was not related to what the anesthesiologist did. It may be related to the fact that the child was not given a blood transfusion to make up for the intraoperative blood losses. Perhaps the post-operative fluid order was inappropriate because the amount of fluid was not sufficient to compensate for bleeding that occurred during the original surgery. It may not be just that the anesthesiologist gave a syringe of medication and then something bad happened. The .4EDICAL MALPRACTICE patient was in shock at that point. The only thing they could have done was to put the child to sleep and suture the vessel. So I agree with Dr. Lytton. We all have to hang together, but I do not believe we are doing that to protect the anesthesiologist in this case. DR. LYTTON: The surgeon is dependent on the anesthesiologist for securing the airway and placing the patient in a position where he can control bleeding. At the same time, the anesthesiologist is having difficulty establishing an airway in a child who has developed a surgical complication. They are interdependent and working for the same goal. There is a tendency for us automatically to think it's the other person's fault. DR. TAE-HEE OH: I am the Chairman of Pediatric Anesthesiology. It's very unclear to me, in this case, who the defendants are: the hospital, the anesthesiologist who gave anesthesia in the morning, the anesthesiologist on call who couldn't intubate the patient, or the nurse. Is the anesthesiologist who, in the morning, discussed all the complications including cardiac arrest with the parents and who gave the anesthesia and went home still liable in this case? MR. SKOLNICK: The limited information available doesn't allow me to conclude definitely who the defendants would be, but the possible defendants in this case would be the surgeon, the anesthesiologist who was called for the emergency, and the hospital, if the claim were made that they should have had a surgeon available to take this patient back to surgery earlier. I wouldn't want to sue the nurse because, first of all, juries don't like it when you sue nurses. I would get no advantage in suing a nurse because, if the nurse was the employee of the hospital, the hospital would be responsible for any negligent act that she performed, and all I would do in making the nurse an additional party would be to get another attorney into the case. I want to bring an action that has the least number of parties, because then I have the least number of attorneys fighting me and the least number of prospective challenges in the jury selection procedure if the case comes up for trial. MR MS. MARTA MORET: I am a free-lance journalist. The journalism profession attempts to bring in the human factors related to matters like medical malpractice. Certainly the story of a six-year-old child, who goes in for routine elective surgery, which results in a comatose condition for the rest of her foreseeable life, sells papers. But I think there are some ethical issues that medical journalists and medical writers are trying to examine. We are seeing a more in-depth review of the issues of informed consent and of the physician-patient relationship. In previous times, this relationship was sacrosanct. I think journalism is trying to get at those kinds of issues and to create an air of responsibility. That's not to say that all journalists are responsible. But I do think they're trying to look at the issue of whether medical malpractice suits are really overwhelming the community. Is it a lawyer-or a physician-created issue? Who is creating the issue? DR. MORRIS WESSEL: It seems to me that, given the income of the surgeons or executives of the hospital, there is a moral responsibility for the hospital board, whether it's a professional or a lay board, to see to it that its system is above reproach. If it's a small hospital, maybe there should be rules that one cannot do certain kinds of surgery if there are no house officers. If there are seven ENT people in the community, maybe each ENT person should stay in for a 24-hour period to supervise. I think nurses should not be put in the position of carrying this responsibility. DR. KATZ: The role of the medical expert is an important issue that requires further discussion. The problem begins by saying that the expert medical witness should give an unbiased opinion. Nobody can give an unbiased opinion, except maybe me, and even I find it difficult all the time. I think the medical expert witness should put himself in the posture that, to the extent possible, he will make the best case for plaintiff or defendant without giving false testimony or asserting things that, on the basis of clinical judgment and expert knowledge, he really could never defend before any kind of medical board. He must remain true to the highest standards of the medical profession. DR. BARASH: I agree that the relationship between the primary physician, in this case the surgeon, and the patient is very important. I think it does the surgeon and the anesthesiologist good to speak to the parents together. There is a fragile relationship, probably the most fragile in medicine, between the anesthesiologist, surgeon, and patient. It's the only time that I'm aware of in medicine when two physicians are caring actively, in a very important way, for a patient. DR. JONATHAN KATZ: There is another actor in this drama that's not represented here, and that is the third-party payor, the insurer-for example, Medicare, Blue Cross. They have two very important roles in this scenario. The first is that they're beginning to dictate highly important medical decisions. For example, we talk about informed consent: the anesthesiologist seeing the patient the evening before surgery. It's not unusual for third-party payors to insist that people be admitted for very serious surgery the morning of surgery, leaving very little time for preparation and consent. More to the point, these third-party payors also insist that certain procedures be done either as an outpatient in a hospital setting or in an outpatient facility, not even a hospital. There are locations in this country where tonsillectomies are being done on an outpatient basis. I wonder if the considerations would be different in this case had this procedure been done and the patient sent home specifically because that's what the insurance carrier demanded. MR. SKOLNICK: Whether the insurance carrier demands it or not, I think, is not the central issue. If you're going to do these procedures on an outpatient basis, you'd better be prepared to deal with emergencies as they arise, without necessarily reducing your capacity to deal effectively with those emergencies. DR. GRAF: Why should the medical community or society as a whole pay millions of dollars for suits that really involve maloccurrence rather than malpractice? MR. SCHUCK: I think the whole question of malpractice needs to be put in a slightly larger context in order to respond to this point. First of all, we do not know very much about how much malpractice actually occurs. In fact, there has been one empirical study of which I am aware in which a panel of physicians reviewed hospital records and determined the number of maloccurrences that were, in their view, attributable to malpractice. It turned out that the number of malpractice claims that were actually brought was a very small percentage, well under ten percent, of the malpractice incidents that they thought had occurred. I believe it was under 5 percent. So another problem that we have to address is the instances of malpractice that occur but are not brought to the attention of either the legal system or some compensatory social insurance system. Second, in some ways, the malpractice crisis is, oddly enough, a triumph of medicine and law, in the sense that many of the incidents that are subject to malpractice actions are the subject of claims precisely because the public has acquired enormous confidence in the medical profession and is disappointed when something goes wrong. It testifies, I think, to the near infallibility that is imputed to doctors, which is clearly excessive relative to the possibilities of science at this time, but which suggests that the public believes that when medicine fails, somebody's to blame.
It's a triumph of law in the sense that some cases are, in fact, cases of malpractice. In other societies, claims are not brought to the courts for compensation because of the way in which the legal system is organized or because there are social insurance systems. It seems to me that the legal reforms of the last 20-25 years have expanded access to care, in part, because of the malpractice problem. Finally, this patient has access to lawyers like David Skolnick because of the way in which we have organized our legal system to vindicate valid claims. Now, it's impossible in any legal system to vindicate valid claims without permitting invalid claims to be tried and lost. Until we have a social system that compensates for maloccurrences, as well as malpractice, it seems to me that we have to rely upon some system of this kind. We can fine tune around the edges, but I don't think the problems we've discussed necessarily invalidate the system as a whole.
SUMMARY
The conference was organized in part to dispel some of the misinformation that interferes with cooperative efforts of attorneys and physicians to redress the malpractice situation. During discussion of the hypothetical case, participants identified how medical decision-making responsibilities were allocated among health care providers caring for the patient. Panel members suggested ways in which medical decision making might be affected by non-medical factors such as third-party reimbursement (e.g., selection of inpatient or outpatient setting, the opportunity to discuss issues related to informed consent prior to the day of a procedure) and potential malpractice litigation (e.g., documentation in charts, use of diagnostic procedures). The characterization of decision-making roles and responsibilities differed somewhat for purposes of malpractice litigation; that is, which caregivers might be named as defendants.
Panel members reconstructed the development of the medical incident into a legal case. Plaintiff's attorney commented that it is often a hospital employee who advises the family to consult an attorney and described some of the constraints on information gathering (e.g., the rule of "discovery" requiring that suit be filed before defendants can be forced to give statements about what happened, insurance contract provisions prohibiting physicians from talking without legal counsel present to persons who indicate that they plan to file suit). He also briefly explained the rationale for the contingency fee arrangement in these cases.
Describing the role of the medical expert witness and the need to review the medical record, he outlined the process of deciding whether to pursue a malpractice case. In making this decision, plaintifl's attorney evaluates the facts to identify issues in the case, to determine if there are deviations from the standard of care, and to try to predict jury reaction. If a suit is filed, defense attorneys employed by the hospital, insurance company, or individual defendants will decide, based on facts including coverage limits, possible publicity, and likelihood of successful prosecution, whether the case should be settled and for what amount. Interests represented by the defense attorneys differ and may affect settlement strategies. Physician feelings of concern for the patient/family or desire for vindication will, to varying degrees, be factors in the decision to try or settle a case.
Panel members explored several important policy issues. Among these were the effect of malpractice cases on doctor-patient communications and ethical issues concerning expert witnesses. Discussants and members of the audience expressed concern that, despite lack of negligence, malpractice cases too frequently result in a substantial verdict or settlement when medical maloccurrence stems from resource allocation constraints. For instance, particularly in small, rural, community hospitals, facilities or staffing may be inadequate for ideal responses to rare complications or emergencies requiring specialized care. Health care providers commented that, in the absence of a social insurance system to provide services in the event of medical maloccurrence, they often bear the burden in professional, emotional, and financial terms when the legal system is used for those purposes.
In 1986, a Connecticut physician, with the support of the State Medical Society, countersued a plaintiff's attorney and his law firm for malicious prosecution of a malpractice suit filed against the physician. In 1988, the physician settled the case for $99,000. Before this case and at the time of the conference, physician countersuits had generally been unsuccessful. This outcome and similar decisions theoretically should make attorneys more selective in bringing malpractice actions. Nonetheless, attorneys and health care providers agreed that, despite legislative and professional efforts to address the medical malpractice situation, the problem persists during this time of dramatic change in health care delivery and medical practice.
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